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Abstract
In this paper we consider the problem of pricing multiple differentiated products. This is challenging as a price
change in one product, not only changes the demand of that particular product, but also the demand for the
other products. To address this problem, customer choice models have recently been introduced as these are
capable of describing customer choice behavior across differentiated products. In the present paper the objective
is to obtain the revenue-maximizing prices when the customer’s decision making process is modelled according to
a particular customer choice model, namely the mixed logit model. The main advantage of using the mixed logit
model, also known as the random coefficients logit model, for this purpose is its flexibility. In the single-product
case we establish log-concavity of the optimization problem under certain regularity conditions. In addition, in
the multi-product case, we present the results of our extensive numerical experiments. These suggest that the
mixed logit model, by taking unobserved customer heterogeneity and flexible substitution patterns into account,
can significantly improve the attainable revenue.
1 Introduction
The problem of pricing a range of differentiated products is very common from a business perspective,
but simultaneously very challenging, since a price change in one product, not only changes the demand
of that particular product, but also the demand for the other products (so called, substitution). In an
attempt to give substance to this problem, customer choice models have recently been introduced in
a pricing framework, as these models have proven useful to describe customer choice behavior across
differentiated products (e.g., Li and Huh, 2011; Gallego and Wang, 2014; Li et al., 2015; Huh and Li,
2015). These customer choice models, also known as discrete choice models, assume that customers
assign utility to products based on the products’ attributes and, subsequently, maximize their utility
and purchase accordingly (or, possibly, choose not to purchase after all). This framework is probabilistic
in a sense that customer choice models provide us with a probability distribution over the alternatives,
thereby recognizing that, besides the observable attributes, the attained utility is also the consequence of
random unobservable factors. The notion that customers value product attributes differently and choose
accordingly seems particularly interesting when customers are offered a menu of differentiated products
and expected revenue needs to be optimized with respect to prices for the full range of products. Besides
its theoretical relevance, this seems practically appealing given the increased availability of customer-level
purchasing data.
1.1 Research objective
The focus of the present paper is on maximizing the expected revenue with respect to prices in a
multi-product setting when the customer’s decision making process is modelled according to a particular
customer choice model, namely the mixed logit model. The main advantage of using the mixed logit
model, also known as the random coefficients logit model, for this purpose is its flexibility. In fact, it has
been shown that the mixed logit model can approximate any customer choice model up to any desired
level of precision (McFadden et al., 2000). With the development of simulation-based estimation methods,
such as Markov chain Monte Carlo, the mixed logit model has become practically useful. Ever since,
it has been extensively used in, e.g., marketing (e.g., Rossi et al., 1996) and transportation sciences
(e.g., Hensher and Greene, 2003) to empirically analyze the decision making behavior of customers.
From an optimization perspective, the main challenge is due to the revenue function, which includes a
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multidimensional integral for which no closed-form solution exists, making the mixed logit model “not
conducive for analysis” in a pricing framework (Akcay et al., 2010). In an attempt to overcome this, we
rely on Laplace integration to obtain a closed-form approximation of the optimization problem.
1.2 Related literature
Existing work on price optimization under customer choice models seems to have been initiated by
Hanson and Martin (1996), who showed that the expected revenue function under the multinomial
logit (MNL) model is not concave with respect to the product prices. It has been shown, however,
by Song and Xue (2007) and Dong et al. (2009) that the profit optimization problem under MNL is
jointly concave with respect to the purchase probabilities,2 which are injective with respect to the prices.
Therefore, the optimal purchase probabilities can be obtained by solving a reformulation of the original
optimization problem and then the optimal prices can be retrieved accordingly. More recently, Aydin
and Porteus (2008) and Akcay et al. (2010) showed that the profit function under MNL with constant
price sensitivities across products is unimodal with respect to the markups, i.e., the prices minus costs,
so that solving the first-order conditions with respect to the markups is sufficient. Moreover, they show
that the optimal markups are constant across all products. This implies that prices are constant across
products under MNL if the cost is uniform (e.g., in case of revenue optimization). However, in an attempt
to explain price variations across differentiated products often observed in practice, Akcay et al. (2010)
show in a setting with dynamic prices and inventory constraints that the optimal markups vary across
products and are higher than the static markups. Besides pricing under MNL, pricing under the nested
logit (NL) model, a generalization of MNL, has received attention recently. The NL model assumes that
customers first choose a nest (i.e., a subset) of products and, subsequently, choose a product from that
particular nest. In Li and Huh (2011) and Gallego and Wang (2014) pricing under the NL model is
studied, whereas Li et al. (2015) and Huh and Li (2015) consider a more general version of the model
with an arbitrary number of levels of nests. Finally, only recently, Alptekinog˘lu and Semple (2016)
introduced the exponomial model for price and assortment optimization. This model has, in contrast to
MNL and NL, a negatively skewed distribution of consumer utilities, which, in particular cases, describes
the choice behavior of customers better than the MNL and NL specifications.
The aforementioned references reveal that the prevailing customer choice models used in a pricing
framework are the MNL and the NL models. The former is arguably the most famous customer choice
model and has received tremendous attention amongst both scientists and practitioners from diverse
fields since it was first introduced by McFadden (1973). Despite its popularity, it suffers from three well-
documented drawbacks, which can be resolved by the mixed logit model (Train, 2009). First of all, MNL
assumes that if customers have identical observable characteristics (e.g., age or income), then they have
identical attribute valuations. In other words, it is assumed that heterogeneity can only originate from
observables and not from unobservable effects, such as latent personal traits. Second of all, MNL assumes
that the unobserved part of a customer’s attained utility is independent over time. This implies that
when panel data is used for estimation, which is often the case in practice, serial dependence in choice
behavior can only be induced by including lagged variables and, e.g., someones persisent latent preference
for a certain unobservable cannot be captured. Finally, the last drawback pertains to what are known
as substitution patterns. These patterns describe how the probability distribution over alternatives
changes given a change in the composition of alternatives or the attributes of the alternatives. The
MNL model assumes a very specific substitution pattern, known under the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) property. This property implies that the relative probability of choosing one alternative
over another, i.e., the ratio of these two probabilities, is independent of the composition of alternatives
or the attributes of the alternatives. In our particular case, this would imply that an increase in the price
2These purchase probabilities are sometimes referred to as market shares, which are, apart from the interpre-
tation, equivalent.
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of one product, would increase the purchase probabilities of the other products with the same proportion
(this is often referred to as proportional substitution). The NL model generalizes MNL and relaxes the
IIA assumption that underlies MNL. In doing so, it is assumed that the alternatives can be partitioned
into nests, so that the IIA property holds within these nests, but not across nests (McFadden et al.,
1978; McFadden, 1980). However, the first two of the aforementioned drawbacks are not addressed by
NL.
1.3 Contribution
This work’s contribution lies in the introduction of the mixed logit model in a multi-product pricing
framework. More precisely, we assume that the products’ perceived quality is multivariate normally dis-
tributed, thereby introducing the notion of customer heterogeneity, as well as allowing for a wide variety
of substitution patterns. Since the corresponding optimization problem comprises a multidimensional
Gaussian integral for which no closed-form solution exists, we approximate the optimization problem by
means of Laplace integration. This allows us to obtain the following structural and numerical results on
the approximated optimization problem.
For the single-product case we show that the approximated optimization problem is in general not
log-concave. However, we show that the approximated optimization problem is strictly log-concave when
the variance is bounded by a quantifiable threshold. In addition, in a numerical study we focus on two
aspects that are particularly interesting when considering the mixed logit model, namely the effect of
unobserved customer heterogeneity and various substitution patterns on optimal prices and attainable
revenue.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we study the problem of optimizing revenue with
respect to prices under mixed logit choice and derive an approximation to this problem, for which we
show it is log-concave in the single-product case. Then, in Section 3 we provide some of the results of our
numerical study. Finally, in Section 4 we conclude by summarizing and providing guidance for future
research.
2 Price Optimization under Mixed Logit Choice
2.1 Problem description
Let us formalize the pricing problem as follows. Assume there is a set J of available products (excluding
the no-choice option) and let J := |J | be the cardinality of this set. We assume that customers assign
utility to each product j ∈ J according to the following linear specification:
Uj = αj − pjβj + ε,
where ε is randomly i.i.d. standardized Gumbel distributed, pj is the prevailing price, βj is the price
sensitivity, and αj is a measure for the perceived quality of product j (which may, e.g., be a function of
the product’s attributes). For convenience, we will assume that βj = β throughout. Let us denote by U0
the ‘outside option’, i.e., the utility that customers enjoy from not purchasing anything. By convention
and without loss of generality we set U0 = ε (or, equivalently, α0 = 0 and p0 = 0).
Under the MNL model, the parameters α := (α1, α2, . . . , αJ) and β are assumed to be fixed. The
resulting choice probability for product j ∈ J has the following convenient closed-form solution, arguably
being the primary reason for its popularity,
qj(α, p) : = P
{
max
k∈J
Uk = Uj
}
(1)
=
eαj−pjβ
1 +
∑
k∈J eαk−pkβ
3
=[
e−(αj−pjβ) +
∑
k∈J
eαk−αj−(pk−pj)β
]−1
,
where p = (p1, p2, . . . , pJ) and the explicit dependence on α is imposed to keep notation in line with fur-
ther model development. In addition, the no-purchase probability equals q0(α, p) =
[
1 +
∑
k∈J e
αk−pkβ]−1.
The mixed logit model generalizes MNL by assuming that the model parameters are randomly
distributed over the population of customers. In this particular study, we consider the case in which α
is multivariate normally distributed with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ. We assume that β, the price
sensitivity, is a fixed (non-random) coefficient. This implies that we incorporate customer heterogeneity
with respect to the overall measure for quality of a product, whereas we assume that the customers are
homogeneous with respect to price sensitivity.3 All in all, the probability that a customer purchases
product j ∈ J ∪ {0} equals
sj(p) : =
∫ [
e−(αj−pjβ) +
∑
k∈J
eαk−αj−(pk−pj)β
]−1
(2pi)−J/2|Σ|−1/2e− 12 (α−µ)>Σ−1(α−µ)dα, (2)
for which no closed-form solution is available. The corresponding optimization problem is
pi∗ := max
p
pi(p), (3)
where pi(p) =
∑
j∈J sj(p)pj . Therefore, the objective is to maximize revenue, which, without much
additional effort, can be turned into a profit-maximizing optimization problem by subtracting marginal
cost from the prices.
2.2 Motivating example
To motivate the use of a mixed logit model in a pricing framework, we consider a single-product toy
example with α ∼ N (µ = 1.0, σ2 = 1.0) and β = 0.1. Then, under MNL or NL we would implicitly
assume that α has a degenerate distribution with point mass at µ. The corresponding revenue-maximizing
price under MNL equals (W (eµ−1)+1)/β = 15.67 (e.g., Li and Huh, 2011), where W denotes the Lambert
W function. To gain insight on the optimal price under mixed logit, we Monte Carlo-integrated the
expected revenue pi(p) for a range of prices, of which the result is shown in Figure 1. The figure reveals
that, at least in this particular case, unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the product’s valuation
causes the MNL price to be too low. Therefore, in an attempt to address such and similar problems,
we proceed by discussing a closed-form approximation to (3). Getting ahead of ourselves, under this
closed-form approximation we would find a price of 17.99 in the aforementioned example, which would
yield a significant improvement.
2.3 Laplace integrating sj
In an attempt to gain insight in optimal pricing under the mixed logit model, we rely on an approximation
to sj based on Laplace’s method of integration and refer to this approximation by LA (Laplace approx-
imation). LA in the current context is closely related to the work of Harding and Hausman (2007), who
used a similar approximation for a different purpose, namely estimation of the mixed logit parameters,
whereas we assume that the parameters are given and optimize revenue with respect to price. We begin
3The framework that will be discussed here allows for β to be normally distributed as well, however, this would
imply that with positive probability β is negative, which has undesirable consequences when we are optimizing
with respect to price. Namely, this would imply that the price of one (or more) of the products can be set to
infinity to collect infinite revenues almost surely.
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Figure 1: The expected revenue pi(p) when α ∼ N (µ = 1.0, σ2 = 1.0) and β = 0.1.
by rewriting (2) as follows:
sj(p) = (2pi)
−J/2|Σ|−1/2
∫
e−λgj(α,p)dα (4)
where λ = 1 and
gj(α, p) =
1
2
(α− µ)>Σ−1(α− µ) +
:=hj(α,p)︷ ︸︸ ︷
log
(
e−(αj−pjβ) +
∑
k∈J
eαk−αj−(pk−pj)β
)
.
In the sequel, we will write gj(α) = gj(α, p) and hj(α) = hj(α, p) where possible to reduce the notational
burden. It has been shown by Harding and Hausman (2007) that gj(α) is convex in α, so that a global
minimizer α∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2, . . . , α
∗
J) in RJ exists (the dependence of α∗ on p and j is suppressed here).
Assume for now that we know α∗, then the general idea of Laplace’s method of integration is that when
λ is ‘large’, the integral in (4) is dominated by a small neighbourhood around α∗. Therefore, we proceed
by Taylor-expanding gj(α) quadratically around its minimum α
∗. For that purpose, let
g′j(x) :=
∂gj(α)
∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=x
and g′′(x) :=
∂2gj(α)
∂α∂α>
∣∣∣∣
α=x
i.e., the gradient and Hessian of gj , respectively, evaluated at x (the latter is independent of j, as will
become clear below). Then,
gj(α) ≈ gj(α∗) + (α− α∗)>g′j(α∗) +
1
2
(α− α∗)>g′′(α∗)(α− α∗) (5)
= gj(α
∗) +
1
2
(α− α∗)>g′′(α∗)(α− α∗),
since g′j(α
∗) = 0 as α∗ is a minimum. When we plug (5) into (4) we obtain
s˜j(p) : = |Σ|−1/2e−λgj(α∗)
∫
(2pi)−J/2e−
λ
2 (α−α∗)>g′′(α∗)(α−α∗)dα
= |Σ|−1/2|λg′′(α∗)|−1/2e−λgj(α∗)
∫
(2pi)−J/2|λg′′(α∗)|1/2e−λ2 (α−α∗)>g′′(α∗)(α−α∗)dα︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
5
= |λA|−1/2e−λ2 (α∗−µ)>Σ−1(α∗−µ)
[
e−(α
∗
j−pjβ) +
∑
k∈J
eα
∗
k−α∗j−(pk−pj)β
]−1
(6)
where
A = IJ + Σ
(
diag(~q(p))− ~q(p)~q(p)>)
~q(p) := (q1(p), . . . , qJ(p))
>
,
qj(p) := qj(α
∗, p).
By construction, this approximation does not guarantee that
∑
j∈J∪{0} s˜j(p) = 1, i.e., that it is a proper
probability mass function. Therefore, the approximations should be scaled accordingly.
All in all, we have obtained a closed-form approximation s˜j(p) for the J-dimensional integral pre-
sented in (2). For this approximation it can be shown that
sj(p) = s˜j(p) · (1 +O(λ−1)),
which implies that for λ→∞, it holds that s˜j → sj . Since in our particular case λ = 1, the relative error
is O(1), i.e., the relative error is bounded by a constant, which is not of much practical use. However, it
has been observed that the approximation is reasonably accurate in a sub-asymptotic setting, i.e., when
λ is low (Butler et al., 2002; Harding and Hausman, 2007; Asmussen et al., 2014). Inspired by these
works together with the notion that alternatives, such as Monte Carlo integration, seem not appropriate
for optimization purposes, we proceed with LA and assess its performance numerically.
It still remains to obtain α∗ ∈ RJ , i.e., the global minimizer of gj . Since it can be shown that gj(α)
is convex, it suffices to solve g′j(α) = 0 for α, i.e., α
∗ is the solution to
Σ−1(α− µ) + ∂hj(α)
∂α
= 0 (7)
where
∂hj(α)
∂α
=
(
q1(α, p), q2(α, p), . . . , qj(α, p)− 1, . . . , qJ(α, p)
)>
.
This system of equations cannot be solved for α analytically. Therefore, we will rely on available efficient
numerical root-finding algorithms to obtain α∗.4
2.4 Price optimization under LA
Let us consider the optimization problem when approximating the mixed logit probabilities with LA. In
doing so, define the total revenue under price vector p as pi(p) :=
∑
j∈J s˜j(p)pj , then,
pi∗ := max
p
pi(p) (8)
represents the maximal attainable revenue. In the single-product case, the optimization problem in (8)
is in general not log-concave since, for example, when α ∼ N (µ = 20, σ2 = 400) and β = 5.0, then
0.626 = log pi(3.75) < 12 log pi(3.25) +
1
2 log pi(4.25) = 0.638. However, under some conditions it can be
shown that (8) is strictly log-concave, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the single-product case with α ∼ N (µ, σ2) the optimization problem in (8) is strictly
log-concave for σ2 ≤ 34.92.
4Alternatively, (7) can be Taylor-approximated to obtain an approximated closed-form solution (Harding and
Hausman, 2007). However, then, in general g′j(α
∗) 6= 0 in (5).
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Proof. Let α∗ be the solution to σ2 = (α − µ) (1 + eα−pβ) and let q(p) = q(α, p)|α=α∗ and q0(p) =
q0(α, p)|α=α∗ , then, after some algebra (for details see Appendix A) it can be derived that
∂ log pi(p)
∂p
=
1
p
− β
=f︷ ︸︸ ︷(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
q0(p)q(p) + σ
2(α∗ − µ)[q0(p)q(p)]2 + q0(p)
[1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)]
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g
. (9)
We proceed by showing that (9) is decreasing in p by showing that ∂f∂p g− f ∂g∂p > 0 under the hypothesis
that σ2 ≤ 34.92. It can be shown that
∂f
∂p
g − f ∂g
∂p
> 0
⇔
q(p) + 3q(p)2 − 8q(p)3 + 6q(p)5 − 2q(p)6 + 1
σ2
+
2
σ4
> 0
⇔
σ2 ≤ 34.92
where the last step results from Sturm’s theorem, which allows us to show that when σ2 = 34.92 the
LHS has no roots for q(p) ∈ [0, 1]. The claim then follows from the observation that LHS increases when
σ2 decreases.
3 Numerical Study
3.1 Single-product price optimization
In the following section, we consider single-product price optimization under the mixed logit choice
model. More precisely, we numerically assess the cost of assuming that the population of customers is
homogeneous, i.e., that α is fixed at value µ, while, in fact, the population of customers is heterogeneous,
i.e., α is normally distributed with expectation µ and variance σ2. In doing so, given parameter values
β, µ, and, σ2, we maximize revenue with respect to price under customer homogeneity by using MNL
and under customer heterogeneity by using LA. The optimal price under MNL is equal to
p˜MNL =
W (eµ−1) + 1
β
(e.g., Li and Huh (2011)).
In addition, let p˜LA be the optimal price under LA obtained by numerically optimizing the logarithm
of (8), which is a strictly concave maximization problem according to Proposition 1. Thereafter, we ap-
proximate the true revenue under p˜MNL and p˜LA, i.e., pi(p˜MNL) and pi(p˜LA), by Monte Carlo integrating
(2) with appropriate convergence conditions. For β = 0.5, µ = 1.0, and varying values of σ2 the revenue,
price, and purchase probability are plotted in Figure 2.
Several interesting comments regarding Figure 2 can be made. First of all, for very low variance
(σ2 ≈ 0) the optimal price under MNL and LA approximately coincide, as one would expect as the
normal distribution degenerates as σ2 → 0. In addition, since the price under MNL is independent of σ2,
we observe a constant price under MNL at p˜MNL ≈ 3.13, which is strictly smaller than p˜LA. The main
insight, however, follows from the observation that under LA, the optimal price increases as the variance
increases, i.e., when the customers become increasingly heterogeneous. This increase in optimal price
under LA for increasing variance results in an increase in revenue both absolute and relative to MNL.
Presumably, when variance is relatively high, by increasing the price one can increase the revenue from
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Figure 2: The top, middle, and bottom plot represent the revenue, price, and purchase prob-
ability, respectively, under LA and MNL for β = 0.5, µ = 1.0, and various values of σ2. The
dashed graphs pertain to LA and the dotted graphs pertain to MNL.
customers that value the product relatively high, whilst this increase outweighs the lost revenue from
customers with a relatively low valuation of the product. However, it seems unjustified to conclude that,
in general, the revenue-maximizing price —which remains unknown— increases in variance or is strictly
larger than p˜MNL, since properties of the exact optimization problem in (3) remain undiscovered in this
work.
3.2 Multi-product price optimization
In the previous section, the implied cost of ignoring customer heterogeneity in the single-product case
was analyzed. In the current section, we numerically assess in a multi-product setting how various model
specifications, i.e., various settings for µ and Σ, affect revenue. The multi-product setting is especially
worth considering, since optimal prices under MNL are all equal when optimizing with respect to revenue
(e.g., Akcay et al. (2010); Li and Huh (2011)). In other words, in the two-dimensional case, under MNL
it holds that p1 = p2, even if the products are differentiated in a sense that their perceived quality differs,
i.e., that α1 6= α2. This seems hard to justify from the business perspective, where an assortment of
differentiated products is in general not priced uniformly.
For illustrative purposes, let us consider the case of two products with parameter settings β = 0.2,
µ = (2, 4)>, and
Σc =
(
5 c
c 5
)
. (10)
As such, the parameter c regulates the dependency between perceived quality of the two products. In
particular, it seems interesting to consider the two border cases, i.e., c = −4.99 and c = 4.99, which
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Figure 3: Revenue as a function of price with β = 0.2, µ = (2, 4)>, and Σc for c ∈
{−4.99, 0, 4.99}. In the figure, the optimal prices under LA and MNL are indicated. The
revenue pi(p) is obtained by means of Monte Carlo integration.
represent, respectively, (near) perfect negative and positive correlation between α1 and α2. For these
cases, together with c = 0, i.e., independent α1 and α2, the revenue functions with corresponding optimal
prices are illustrated in Figure 3. This figure reveals the following notable aspects. First of all, it can
be observed that —at least in this particular case— the maximal revenue under LA is larger than under
MNL and that the maximal revenue decreases when c increases from −4.99 to 0 and, subsequently, to
4.99. Presumably, the decrease of potential revenue in c may be attributed to the fact that with increasing
c, the differentiation amongst products decreases, so that the product assortment becomes less attractive
overall. In other words, loosely speaking, when c is ‘low’, most customers ‘like’ either one of the products,
whereas, when c is ‘high’, some customers like both products and some dislike both products, leading to
lower (potential) revenue. This also leads us to belief that the framework presented here has interesting
implications for assortment optimization under customer choice models, which is a related optimization
problem that received considerable attention in the recent decades (see, e.g., Rusmevichientong et al.
(2014) for assortment optimization under mixed logit with the parameters being randomly distributed
with finite support).
Second of all, when considering LA, as c increases we observe that the optimal prices converge to a
single price, i.e., for c↗ 5.00 it holds that p1 ≈ p2. This can be observed from the third plot in Figure
3, where c = 4.99 and (p1, p2) = (18.71, 18.72), as well as from Figure 4 where the relationship between
p1 and p2 and c under LA is illustrated. This occurs not only in this particular case, but occurred for
all parameter configurations that were considered during extensive numerical experiments. Presumably,
since the bivariate normal distribution degenerates as c ↗ 5.00, prices coincide in a similar fashion as
under the MNL model.
4 Conclusion
In the current work, we introduced the mixed logit model for the purpose of pricing multiple differentiated
products. Until now, attention has primarily been on two particular choice models, namely MNL and
NL, for which it has proven to be challenging to develop structural results, such as (log-)concavity of
the profit or revenue function and characterizations of optimal prices for various model specifications.
The mixed logit model can —in contrast to aforementioned models— account for unobserved customer
heterogeneity and allows for flexible substitution patterns. However, the model is notoriously hard to
analyze, as the purchase probabilities, and thus the revenue function, comprises a multidimensional
Gaussian integral. In an attempt to address this challenge we approximate the problem by means of
9
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Figure 4: Optimal prices under LA as c increases with β = 0.2, µ = (2, 4)>, and Σc as in (10).
Laplace integration.
In the single product case, we were able to establish log-concavity under certain distributional con-
ditions, more specifically on the variance of the parameter that measures the perceived quality of the
product. The extensive work required to establish this, suggests that proving a similar claim in the
multi-product case is not feasible, at least with the current approach. The multi-product case, however,
has been analyzed numerically. More specifically, for illustrative purposes we considered the two-product
instance and considered the effect of unobserved customer heterogeneity and various substitution specifi-
cations on the optimal prices and attainable revenue. In general, the numerical experiments indicate that
increased customer heterogeneity with respect to perceived quality leads to higher attainable revenue.
Presumably, extra revenue can be earned from the customers that value the product(s) relatively high.
Similarly, increased negative covariance between the perceived quality of two products also increases the
attainable revenue, which may be contributed to the increased overall attractiveness of the assortment.
Although it has proven to be burdensome to analyze the mixed logit model in a pricing framework, we
believe that the model may be appreciated for its flexibility and, therefore, its capability to reflect realis-
tic phenomena. For future research, many questions remain unanswered, e.g., regarding (log-)concavity
of the revenue function with multiple products and the effect of product-specific price sensitivities. In
addition, our work may encourage others to introduce the mixed logit model in an assortment optimiza-
tion framework, where the decision variable is not price, but on selecting the optimal subset of products
to offer on a certain occasion.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Preliminaries
Some useful expressions are the following:
∂α
∂p
=
(α− µ)eα−pββ
1 + (α− µ+ 1)eα−pβ (by implicit differentiation)
∂α
∂p
− β = −β 1 + e
α−pβ
1 + (α− µ+ 1)eα−pβ
∂q0(α, p)
∂p
=
q(α, p)β
1 + (α− µ+ 1)eα−pβ
∂q(α, p)
∂p
= −∂q0(α, p)
∂p
∂[q0(α, p)q(α, p)]
∂p
=
βq0(α, p)q(α, p)(1− 2q0(α, p))
1 + σ2q0(α, p)q(α, p)
∂q0(α, p)
2
∂p
=
2βq0(α, p)q(α, p)
1 + (α− µ+ 1)eα−pβ
Proof. Let α∗ be the solution to σ2 = (α− µ)(1 + eα−pβ) and note that α∗ > µ and let q(p) = q(α∗, p)
and q0(p) = q0(α
∗, p). Then, the approximate purchase probability is
s˜(p) =
[
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
]−1/2
q(p)e−
(α∗−µ)2
2σ2
and the corresponding revenue function pi(p) = s˜(p)p, so that
log pi(p) = log p− 1
2
log
(
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
)
+ log q(p)− (α
∗ − µ)2
2σ2
where we denote the four parts of this function by f (I), f (II), f (III), and f (IV ), respectively. Conse-
quently, we have that
∂ log pi(p)
∂p
=
∂f (I)
∂p
+
∂f (II)
∂p
+
∂f (III)
∂p
+
∂f (IV )
∂p
where
∂f (I)
∂p
=
1
p
∂f (II)
∂p
= − σ
2
2(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
∂(q0(p)q(p))
∂p
= − σ
2
2(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
(
βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
− 2q0(p) βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
)
=
σ2βq0(p)q(p)(2q0(p)− 1)
2(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))2
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∂f (III)
∂p
=
1
q(p)
∂q(p)
∂p
= − βq0(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
∂f (IV )
∂p
= −α
∗ − µ
σ2
∂α∗
∂p
= − (α
∗ − µ)βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
so that
∂ log pi(p)
∂p
=
1
p
+
σ2βq0(p)q(p)(2q0(p)− 1)
2(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))2
− βq0(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
− (α
∗ − µ)βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
=
1
p
+
βq0(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
[
σ2q(p)(q0(p)− 1/2)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
− (α∗ − µ)q(p)− 1
]
=
1
p
− βq0(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
[ 1
2 (σ
2q(p) + 2)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
+ (α∗ − µ)q(p)
]
=
1
p
− βq0(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
[
( 12σ
2 + α∗ − µ)q(p) + σ2(α∗ − µ)q0(p)q(p)2 + 1
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
]
=
1
p
− β
=f︷ ︸︸ ︷(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
q0(p)q(p) + σ
2(α∗ − µ)[q0(p)q(p)]2 + q0(p)
[1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)]
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g
.
To prove the claim, it suffices to show that this expression decreases in p. We will do so by showing that
∂f
∂p g − f ∂g∂p > 0 under the hypothesis. Therefore, let
f (a) =
(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
q0(p)q(p)
and
f (b) = σ2(α∗ − µ)[q0(p)q(p)]2,
so that
∂f (a)
∂p
=
(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
∂(q0(p)q(p))
∂p
+
∂α∗
∂p
q0(p)q(p)
=
(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
βq0(p)q(p)(1− 2q0(p))
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
+
βσ2q0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
q0(p)q(p)
=
βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
[(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
(1− 2q0(p)) + σ2q0(p)q(p)
]
and
∂f (b)
∂p
= σ2
∂α∗
∂p
[q0(p)q(p)]
2 + 2σ2(α∗ − µ)q0(p)q(p)∂(q0(p)q(p))
∂p
= σ2[q0(p)q(p)]
2 βσ
2q0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
+ 2σ2(α∗ − µ)q0(p)q(p)βq0(p)q(p)(1− 2q0(p))
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
=
βσ2[q0(p)q(p)]
2
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
[
σ2q0(p)q(p) + 2(α
∗ − µ)(1− 2q0(p))
]
.
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Consequently, we can obtain
∂f
∂p
=
∂f (a)
∂p
+
∂f (b)
∂p
+
βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
=
βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
[(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
(1− 2q0(p)) + . . .
σ2q0(p)q(p)
(
σ2q0(p)q(p) + 2(α
∗ − µ)(1− 2q0(p)) + 1
)
+ 1
]
and
∂g
∂p
= 2σ2βq0(p)q(p)(1− 2q0(p)).
We proceed by checking that ∂f∂p g − f ∂g∂p > 0, which is sufficient to prove the claim, i.e.,
βq0(p)q(p)
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
[(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
(1− 2q0(p)) + σ2q0(p)q(p)+
σ2q0(p)q(p)
(
σ2q0(p)q(p) + 2(α
∗ − µ)(1− 2q0(p))
)
+ 1
]
[1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)]
2−[(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
q0(p)q(p) + σ
2(α∗ − µ)[q0(p)q(p)]2 + q0(p)
]
2σ2βq0(p)q(p)(1− 2q0(p)) > 0
⇔
(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
[(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
(1− 2q0(p))+
σ2q0(p)q(p)
(
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p) + 2(α
∗ − µ)(1− 2q0(p))
)
+ 1
]
−
2σ2(1− 2q0(p))
[(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
q0(p)q(p) + σ
2(α∗ − µ)[q0(p)q(p)]2 + q0(p)
]
> 0
⇔
(1− 2q0(p))
{
(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ+ 2σ2(α∗ − µ)q0(p)q(p)
)
−
2σ2
[(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − µ
)
q0(p)q(p) + σ
2(α∗ − µ)[q0(p)q(p)]2 + q0(p)
]}
+
(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
[
σ2q0(p)q(p)
(
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
)
+ 1
]
> 0
⇔
σ2(1− 2q0(p))
{
(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
(
1
2
+
α∗ − µ
σ2
+ 2(α∗ − µ)q0(p)q(p)
)
−
2
(
σ2
2
+ α∗ − 2µ
)
q0(p)q(p)− 2σ2(α∗ − µ)[q0(p)q(p)]2 − 2q0(p)
}
+
(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
[
σ2q0(p)q(p)
(
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
)
+ 1
]
> 0
⇔
σ2(1− 2q0(p))
{
1
2
+
α∗ − µ
σ2
+
(
α∗ − µ− σ
2
2
)
q0(p)q(p)− 2q0(p)
}
+
(1 + σ2q0(p)q(p))
[
σ2q0(p)q(p)
(
1 + σ2q0(p)q(p)
)
+ 1
]
> 0⇔
(α∗ − µ)(1 + eα∗−pβ)(1− 2q0(p))
{
1
2
+
1
2
(α∗ − µ)q0(p)q(p)
(
1− eα∗−pβ
)
− q0(p)
}
+
(α∗ − µ)3q(p)3 + 2(α∗ − µ)2q(p)2 + 2(α∗ − µ)q(p) + 1 > 0
⇔
13
(α∗ − µ)q0(p)(1− eα∗−pβ)− 1
2
(α∗ − µ)2q0(p)q(p)
(
1− eα∗−pβ
)2
− 1
2
(α∗ − µ)(1− eα∗−pβ)+
(α∗ − µ)3q(p)3 + 2(α∗ − µ)2q(p)2 + 2(α∗ − µ)q(p) + 1 > 0
⇔
(α∗ − µ)3q(p)3 + (α∗ − µ)2
(
2q(p)2 − 1
2
q0(p)q(p)(1− eα∗−pβ)2
)
+
(α∗ − µ)
(
q0(p)(1− eα∗−pβ)− 1
2
(1− eα∗−pβ) + 2q(p)
)
+ 1 > 0
⇔
(α∗ − µ)3q(p)3 + (α∗ − µ)2
(
7
2
q(p)2 − 1
2
q(p)− 1
2
q(p)2eα
∗−pβ
)
+
1
2
σ2 + 1 > 0
⇔
2(α∗ − µ)q(p)3 +
(
7− eα∗−pβ
)
q(p)2 − q(p) + 2 + (α
∗ − µ)(1 + eα∗−pβ)
(α∗ − µ)2 > 0
⇔
2(α∗ − µ)q(p) + 2 + (α
∗ − µ) + (α∗ − µ)eα∗−pβ
q(p)2(α∗ − µ)2 +
q0(p)
q(p)
− q(p)
q0(p)
+ 6 > 0
⇔
2σ2q0(p)q(p) +
2 + σ2
σ4q(p)2q0(p)2
+
q0(p)
q(p)
− q(p)
q0(p)
+ 6 > 0
⇔
2σ2q0(p)
3q(p)3 + 6q0(p)
2q(p)2 + q0(p)
3q(p)− q0(p)q(p)3 + 1
σ2
+
2
σ4
> 0
which holds for σ2 < 1. Now suppose σ2 ≥ 1, then
2σ2(q(p)− q(p)2)3 + 6q(p)4 − 10q(p)3 + 3q(p)2 + q(p) + 1
σ2
+
2
σ4
>
q(p) + 3q(p)2 − 8q(p)3 + 6q(p)5 − 2q(p)6 + 1
σ2
+
2
σ4
.
Now, by using Sturm’s theorem one can show that for σ2 ≤ 34.92 the last expression has no roots for
q(p) ∈ [0, 1]. Together with the observation that for any values q(p) ∈ [0, 1] and σ2 ∈ [0, 34.92] this
expression is positive, leads to
q(p) + 3q(p)2 − 8q(p)3 + 6q(p)5 − 2q(p)6 + 1
σ2
+
2
σ4
> 0
for σ2 ≤ 34.92.
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